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Implications of Endogamy in the Southwest Eurasian
Highlands: Another look at Jack Goody’s theory of production,
property and kinship
Patrick Heady and Lale Yalçın-Heckmann
ABSTRACT
Reviving interest in Jack Goody’s comparative and historical work
on systems of production, kinship and state organization
prompts us to revisit his analysis in ‘Production and Reproduction’
– looking both at the data and at the explanatory framework.
While we accept Goody’s emphasis on the central importance of
productive technology, we nevertheless contend that he
underplays the role of kinship and marriage systems in fostering
agricultural production, the growth of state power and inequality.
We argue that this oversight results from Goody’s ‘resolute
materialism’ and that a more realistic view requires a more
systematic formulation of the interactions between pragmatic
rationality and the logic of social identity and cohesion. We
develop an alternative argument, adding a Maussian analysis of
exchange and identity and evaluate its implications using
Goody’s data and our ethnographies. Finally, we consider the
implications this raises for future research – and how these
might be answered by ethnography and comparison.
Introduction
In a review of Goody’s intellectual legacy written more than ten years ago, Hann (2008)
focused on Goody’s comparative work on inheritance systems, and their connections to
many aspects of productive and social life – praising its intellectual scope, geographical
and temporal range – and the willingness to engage with statistical methods and theories
of social evolution. Hann also noted however that Goody’s work was theoretically and
methodologically unfashionable among social anthropologists – but hoped, given the
importance of its themes, and their relevance to present-day political developments,
that this situation might be about to change.
Since the time Hann wrote, the themes that Goody discussed and Goody’s own contri-
bution, have indeed received renewed attention. The revival has come partly from archae-
ologists and has owed a great deal to technical developments – including new ways of
assessing biological relatedness and place of origin from human remains (Ensor, Irish,
and Keegan 2017), and inferring kinship structure and degrees of inequality from the rela-
tive sizes and arrangement of buildings (Ensor 2017; Kohler et al. 2017). The renewed
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interest has also come from evolutionary anthropologists, who have pioneered ‘phyloge-
netic’ ways of projecting social arrangements back into the past, based on an analogy
between linguistic change and the Darwinian development of separate but related
species. Working with data on Indo-European speaking societies, Fortunato and col-
leagues have used this approach to revisit several of the themes tackled by Goody (Fortu-
nato 2017; Fortunato, Holden, and Mace 2006).
However, so far this revival has had little impact on social anthropology itself. Writing as
social anthropologists who sympathize with Goody’s agenda, we want to contribute to the
reviving comparative and meta-historical agenda from the perspective of social anthropol-
ogy. In order to re-examine Goody’s agenda, we refer to another comparative thinker and
re-work and extend Goody’s model through Maussian theory of gift exchange. Goody
himself argued that comparative methods and ethnographic research should be comp-
lementary rather than alternative approaches – and neither is likely to yield its full poten-
tial without referring to the other. As we will show below, this implied warning applies as
much to Goody’s own comparative work as to anyone else’s. An ethnographically inspired
review of his analysis raises issues that deserve further exploration – both by further eth-
nographic research and by using the developing techniques of comparative and archae-
ological research.
A critical discussion of Goody’s thesis in Production and Reproduction
The most important single publication in Goody’s comparative opus is Production and
Reproduction (1976, henceforth PAR). The work starts by noting a contrast between
African and European (more generally Eurasian1) arrangements concerning family prop-
erty and inheritance. In Africa husbands and wives typically have separate property, and
on the death of either partner, the deceased person’s property passes to members of
their family (or rather lineage) of origin. Property therefore always remains within the
same lineage. In Europe husbands and wives typically hold their property jointly, and
some of this property is inherited by both sons and daughters – daughters often receiving
some of this as a dowry when they marry. If one is thinking in terms of lineages, (more
particularly of patrilineages), property inherited by daughters passes out of the lineage
group – and is therefore referred to by Goody as diverging devolution (Goody 1976, 6–8).
Goody was interested in the contrast between the African system of lineal inheritance
and the European (more generally Eurasian) system of diverging devolution – and wants
to understand their causes and consequences. He was particularly interested in their conse-
quences for kinship practices – what he refers to as the domestic domain – including such
variables as monogamy versus polygamy, restrictions on pre-marital sexual behaviour, and
the choice of marriage partner. This is the issue on which we will focus here: in particular the
contrast between the rule of lineage exogamy, which is virtually universal in sub-Saharan
Africa, and the practices of marrying within the same group – whether by social class,
caste, locality or lineage – which Goody refers to variously as endogamy, homogamy and
in-marriage – and which is commonly, but not universally, found in Eurasia.
The theory
Goody’s explanation took the form of the causal model set out in Table 12 below.
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There are two points to note about the way the table is set out. The ﬁrst is that causation
runs from left to right: from Economy as the ﬁrst cause, to Marriage System as the ﬁnal
eﬀect. The second point is that causation proceeds one column at a time – so that any
causal relationship between variables in non-adjacent columns is assumed to be due to
their mutual relationship to the variable or variables in the column in between. The fact
that diverging devolution is the only variable in column 3 expresses Goody’s belief that
it provides the sole connection between in-marriage and the other variables in the
model. Goody argues that this model should be seen as a ﬁrst approximation both to
the underlying causal relationships, and to the likely (pre)historical order in which the
developments ﬁrst occurred (Goody 1976, 8, 37–40).
To grasp the essence of Goody’s explanation, it is best to start with the proximate cause
of in-marriage (i.e. with the transition between columns 3 and 4 at the right-hand end of
the table). Goody argues that there will be a strong association between diverging devo-
lution and in-marriage. The reason for this is that, given the existence of diverging devolu-
tion, parents need to control their daughters’ marriages, in order to prevent them
transmitting property outside the social group.
But why are daughters endowed with property in the ﬁrst place? Goody oﬀers two
explanations (depicted in the possible transitions between columns 2 and 3) both of
which could account for the widespread presence of diverging devolution in Europe,
and its virtual absence in Africa. The ﬁrst is that, in a property-stratiﬁed society, it is necess-
ary to endow daughters in order to enable them to make an equal match. The second
argument (which derives from the work of Boserup (1970)) is that if the husband contrib-
utes more labour to the family economy, the family of the wife needs to balance the hus-
band’s labour by contributing more property.
The ultimate cause, however, is the development of advanced agriculture – in Eurasia,3
but not in Africa – which (as depicted in the transitions between column 1 and column 2)
demands a high input of male labour, and leads to the development of property stratiﬁed
state societies.
Outline of the statistical evidence
The evidence comes from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967) which is a data-
base, compiled from ethnographies and historical accounts, of codes representing
selected characteristics of 8634 societies. The relevant ﬁndings in terms of correlations
between diﬀerent factors are summarized in Table 2.
We would like to make a general point about this correlation matrix: all the coeﬃcients
are positive. This means that the variables which, according to Goody’s theory ought to go
Table 1. Goody’s causal model.
Causal order (1) → (2) → (3) → (4)
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together, do in fact go together – which shows that the theory does at least have a certain
basic credibility. It is important to bear this overall ﬁnding in mind, because in the next few
paragraphs, we will present some serious criticisms of particular aspects of the theory.
But this overall result says nothing about the speciﬁc causal connections between the
diﬀerent variables, or the overall causal sequence. At this point any investigation based
on synchronic correlations faces a well-known diﬃculty. This is that, although correlations
can strongly suggest the existence and strength of speciﬁc causal connections, they cannot
determine their direction. Nevertheless, they do provide important clues about the poten-
tial validity of the model. In order to extract these clues what Goody did (or rather what J.C.
Mitchell did on Goody’s behalf (Goody 1976, 37)) was to carry out a path analysis that used
the correlation matrix to estimate the strength of the connections between the diﬀerent
variables, on the assumption that the overall causal order in Table 1 was correct. By compar-
ing the strength of the observed correlations with those predicted by the model, it is poss-
ible to assess which aspects of the model have most empirical support, and also to identify
places where – regardless of the direction of causation – additional hypotheses would need
to be included in the model in order to explain the empirical ﬁndings. The results, which
were set out in diagrammatic form on page 39 of PAR, did not entirely conﬁrm Goody’s
expectations. The ﬁrst major diﬀerence is that diverging devolution is much more strongly
connected with male farming than with complex polity – suggesting that Boserup’s (1970)
explanation is nearer the truth than Goody’s original status-conservation theory. The
second is that, although diverging devolution does indeed provide a causal link between
in-marriage and the two variables in column 2 of Table 1 (complex polity and male
farming), there are also direct causal connections between in-marriage and the two other
variables, which are independent of diverging devolution. In other words, Goody’s own
data suggest that, although there does appear to be a causal link between inheritance
systems and endogamy, endogamy is also connected with farming systems and with pol-
itical organization in other ways which are not due to property strategies.5
Ethnographic critique of Goody’s model
These quantitative ﬁndings are consistent with two lines of criticism that emerge from the
ethnographic and anthropological literature. The ﬁrst concerns a mismatch between
Goody’s emphasis on the processes of agricultural intensiﬁcation, state formation and
social stratiﬁcation. These processes aﬀect all the advanced societies of Eurasia, and the












Complex polity 0.41 0.26 0.25 0.30
Advanced agriculture 0.41 0.42 0.22 0.22
Male farming 0.26 0.42 0.40 0.33
Diverging devolution 0.25 0.22 0.40 0.32
In-marriage 0.30 0.22 0.33 0.32
aThe ﬁgures in this table are reproduced from Table 22, on page 132 of Production and Reproduction (Goody 1976).
bThis is a type of correlation coeﬃcient that is appropriate for binary variables.
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need to preserve status is, by deﬁnition, strongest among the rich and powerful. The eth-
nographic evidence however is clear that endogamy is particularly marked in the circum-
Mediterranean area (Bonte 1994) – and also that it is often not associated with social stra-
tiﬁcation. Several studies of endogamous circum-Mediterranean communities stress that it
is accompanied by an ethos of equality and that local endogamy is, if anything, more
characteristic of less prosperous families than of the richer members of the community
(Barth 1953; Bates 1974; Khuri 1970; Leach 1940).
The other line of criticism concerns what Hann (2016) refers to as Goody’s ‘strongmateri-
alism’. As we have seen, in Goody’s causal model, endogamy is very closely tied to consider-
ations of property. But it can also be viewed in other ways. Some authors (e.g. Pina-Cabral
1992) see endogamy as primarily an expression of social unity. It can also be seen as a con-
ceptual system: a particular way of understanding the nature of marriage and the relation-
ships to which it gives rise. Indeed Goody himself treats it this way in the opening pages of
PAR, though that part of his discussion is not reﬂected in his causal model.
Despite slanging matches about ‘vulgar materialism’ and ‘vulgar idealism’ (Hann 2017,
235), these diﬀerent interpretations of endogamy need not be incompatible. They can be
inter-related in various ways, and all can potentially be linked to other aspects of social and
economic organization in order to account for the presence or absence of endogamy in
diﬀerent societies. However it is clear, from the statistical evidence discussed above,
that the causal model’s exclusive concentration on the causes and consequences of diver-
ging devolution does not provide a complete explanation of the connections between
endogamy, agriculture and socio-political organization.
In the next section of this paper we present ethnographic data from two societies in
which female inheritance does not play an important role, in order to explore what
other connections there might be.
A natural experiment: Endogamy without diverging devolution
South-east Anatolia and north-east Italy – Similarities between two highland
societies
The data comes from our own ﬁrst ﬁeld sites: the Kurdish village of Sisin in the south-
eastern Turkish province of Hakkari (Yalçın-Heckmann 1991) and the Romance speaking
village of Ovasta, in the sub-region of Carnia in north-east Italy (Heady 1999). Both villages
had populations of about 175–250 in the 1980s. They were situated in mountainous areas,
with traditional economies based on a mixture of farming and transhumant herding, and
in each case an important role was played by common property held by the village as a
whole. In both places, post-marital residence was strictly patrilocal, and property was
inherited almost exclusively by males, with brothers receiving equal shares. Though the
ideologies of marriage diﬀered, they both attached a positive value to locally endogamous
matches, without making them an exclusive rule. In both places, unions between a man
and a woman from the same village amounted to about half of the resident married
couples (Heady 1999, 5–8, 25–35, 131–134; Yalçın-Heckmann 1991, 228–241).
Since several of these characteristics are shared with other circum-Mediterranean
societies, these two ﬁeld sites provide a kind of natural experiment which may also
throw light on the reasons for the high levels of endogamy in this part of the world.
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As a ﬁrst step, we present the data on endogamy itself. Tribal endogamy was 100%
within Sisin.6 Among all 65 existing marriages in Sisin at the time of ﬁeldwork, 22 of
them involved couples who were not cognate/agnate to one another, though they
were nevertheless members of the same tribe. All other marriages were between kin.
The ﬁgures for Ovasta are as follows: at the time of ﬁeldwork sixteen of the 44 existing mar-
riages (36 percent) were locally endogamous. Nearly all the rest were patrilocal, with non-
Ovastan women moving to Ovasta to join their husbands. The endogamy rate had been
declining in recent decades – from 10 (53%) of the 19 marriages contracted before 1960, to
just 1 of the 8 marriages contracted between 1980 and 1991 – and the changing marriage
patterns were associated with other social and economic changes. In the discussion that
follows, we will focus on the system as it was when endogamy was still frequent.
We would now like to describe how the two systems work – focussing particularly on
their implications for status, conﬂict and cooperation. The discussion is structured primar-
ily around the axes of (a) seniority, (b) gender, (c) economy, and (d) military activities. The
ﬁrst two axes involve linked principles of hierarchical classiﬁcation and are related to the
system of social meanings associated with endogamy. The other two axes involve insti-
tutional spheres in which individual men, and their families, compete for personal
status, but in a way that accepts and reproduces an underlying principle of categorical
equality and cooperation.
Status, unity and the gendered life-cycle
We begin with seniority. In Hakkari, as in many Muslim and patrilineal societies, seniority
meant higher status (Yalçın-Heckmann 1991, 149–167). Senior men were respected in the
society, they were given better and ﬁrst food, better places to sit, were addressed with
respectful terms, and in general were treated diﬀerentially and had an advantage over
younger men and certainly over women. There were, however, two aspects of this senior-
ity: it was dependent on the life cycle, hence all men could expect to be respected with
advancing age. The second aspect is that respect was also associated with the lineage
and clan structure and historical signiﬁcance, taking the form of lineage or clan honour,
as has often been discussed in relation to clan ‘sharaf’ (Barth 1953; Eickelman 1998;
King and Stone 2010; Leach 1940; Meeker 1976; Peters 1967). This kind of honour and
respect was due to all men (and women) who belonged to a particular tribal category,
hence it worked as a levelling mechanism among men (but not as much between men
and women), among those who were of course members of this particular lineage/clan.
In the village of Sisin, in Hakkari, solidarity amongmenwas framedwithin the conceptual
model of patriliny.7 The Kurdish kinship terminology was used within the tribal system to
express this sense of unity by referring to all patrilineal members of the lineage and clan
as classiﬁcatory patrilineal cousins (pismam)8 – thereby creating not only a feeling of inti-
macy and closeness (Cuisenier 1975; Eickelman 1998) but also, we argue, structural equality,
as has been well documented in segmentary societies (Evans-Pritchard 1970; Peters 1967;
Tillion 1983 [1966]). The sense of patrilineal solidarity could be stressed evenmore strongly –
by making the rhetorical claim that ‘we are all one man’ – especially when one wanted to
highlight the need to prevent dissent within various levels of tribal segmentation.
This patrilineal model, was, as King and Stone (2010) would expect, closely linked with
the performance of masculinity (mêranî in Kurdish, see also Herzfeld (1985) on similar
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performances of mountain Cretan manhood, or Gilsenan (1996) on Lebanese rhetoric of
manhood), and with strong notions of patrilineal continuity (xwîn in Kurdish, soy in
Turkish). It was also linked to the subordination of women. In Hakkari, women’s fertility,
labour, marriage choices, and inheritance were strictly controlled by men. Women in Hak-
kari’s semi-nomadic tribal society were born into and grew up in large households, where
female and male chores were strongly diﬀerentiated and women worked very hard and
their work was essential to household’s economic livelihood and marriage strategies.
Although gender segregation as known in some Muslim societies was not very signiﬁcant
(cf. Tillion 1983 [1966]), patriarchal and discriminatory practices against women such as
physical violence, honour killings, and early/child marriage practices were not uncommon.
Yet, women in these tribal contexts were also valued and signiﬁcant as individuals. There
were even cases where women became the name givers to lineages. And women were also
valued for making links between otherwise patrilineally and descent divided lineages.9 Quite
apart from theseprominent examples, the reason given for endogamousmarriage – that they
didn’t want to give their girls away to strangers – expresses a sense that young women are
valuable, and all the more so because they are already members of the group.
They were however subordinate, as indeed – if rather less so – were their brothers.
Young men had few possibilities of challenging the senior men who were in control of
property and women. One had access to these ‘valuables’ as one went through the life
cycle of growing up, going to the military, marrying, having children, and ﬁnally separating
one’s own household either from the parental or the fraternal household.
There was however one way in which young men could challenge their subordination,
particularly to the marriage plans made for them by senior men (cf. Bates 1974). Bride-kid-
napping was a common strategy, of which the local interpretation would vary between
elopement with consent or abduction without the consent of the woman. This was a situ-
ation which put the symbolism of patrilineal unity and male honour to one of its strongest
tests. Especially in cases where a woman was thought to be agreeing to the kidnapping
man’s will (hence elopement, in anthropological jargon), the male relatives of the
woman would acknowledge the challenge by taking up arms and chasing the kidnappers,
but they would shoot in the air as in mock ﬁghting between tribally close segments. If the
wife-kidnappers were from segments of the tribe, which were structurally close to the
lineage of the kidnapped woman, or if the kidnappers were from aﬃnally related lineages
and households or were neighbours (all cases where close group solidarity would be the
essential basis for collective action), the mediators of the conﬂict would use the following
formula most often: em mêrovê tekin, ‘we are all one man’.
Much of this discussion carries over unchanged to Carnia. Here too, membership of the
community was based on descent through males – with the same implication of strictly
patrilocal marriage. Households were multi-generational and extended, with a clear gen-
dered division of labour, and authority vested in the older generation – with the senior
woman having authority over daughters and daughters-in-law, and the senior man
having authority over his sons and the household as a whole. In Carnia, as in Hakkari,
there was a strong emphasis on the importance of local unity – and villagers all shared
in the collective status brought by the visible prosperity and reputed solidarity of their
village. As in Hakkari, the community was linked together by ties of both descent and mar-
riage – and both kinds of tie have a role in the symbolism of village unity. However, a
diﬀerent emphasis is given to each kind of tie.
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To start, let us look at descent. While in Hakkari the descent tie is treated as the primary
source of unity, in Carnia it is not. Most people do not trace their descent back more than
about four generations, and the inhabitants of any particular village do not see them-
selves, even ideally, as the patrilineal descendants of a single male ancestor. Instead,
the village is seen as united by ritual kinship – ties of individual and collective god-parent-
hood (Heady 2018). This is still descent of a kind, but it does not embody the patrilineal
principle that underlies collective identity in Hakkari (and family identity in both places).
If the emphasis on descent is weaker in Carnia, the stress on unity through marriage is
stronger. Carnia shares with Hakkari the reluctance to give girls away to strangers, and
also the sense that the exchange of brides can create ties of solidarity. But instead of a
restricted exchange of brides taking place between two families, the Carnian system
involves the generalized exchange of brides between all families of the village.10 This is
linked to another diﬀerence: the choice of marriage partners was a matter for the young
people of the village – not for their families. As we have seen, this possibility exists in the
form of kidnapping/elopement in Hakkari: but while it is an alternative form in Hakkari, it
was the norm in Carnia, where parentally arranged marriages were rare exceptions.
To make this possible, both the practical and symbolic arrangements for socializing
between young men and women were very diﬀerent from those in Hakkari. Between
their late teens and marriage, young people of both sexes formed a recognized social
group within the village expected to spend time together free from the supervision of
the older generation. Honour killings were unheard of, but young women did face public
shaming for sexual immorality – in two contexts. The ﬁrst was if a girl cheated on her
regular boyfriend, in which case the shaming was done by the young men of the village.
The second was if she became pregnant and could not persuade the child’s father to
marry her. The role of young men as controllers of courtship was expressed in an annual
ritual in which young unmarried men entered every house in the village, and then – with
the assistance of the young women – organized a dance for the village as a whole. After
the house visit – but before the dance – the young men publically announced the names
of courting couples, and the parents were obliged to allow their daughters to be escorted
to the dance by the partner who had been announced by the young men (Heady 2003).
A ﬁnal angle on the social meaning of marriage is provided by the accompanying pay-
ments. Women in Hakkari did not bring in into marriage any property as trousseaus, but as
long as there was endogamy there was no bride-price paid either.11 More signiﬁcantly, the
lack of trousseau and bride-price was explained as maintaining equality between the tribal
members and as not giving daughters away to strangers. The principle of equality among
tribesmen was ampliﬁed in the marriage practice of direct exchange of marriage partners,
where two womenmoved between two diﬀerent households as wives of twomen in these
households.
In Carnia too, no bride-price was involved for marriages within the village community,
but a symbolic bride-price was demanded for marriages to outsiders. However, the bride-
price was paid, not to the girl’s family, but to the young men of the village (who spent it on
a big party). Brides did not bring dowries in the form of housing or land into the marriage,
but they did bring trousseaux – in the form of clothes, linen, work tools, and also the mat-
tress for the marital bed (which had been jointly sewed by the bride and her women
friends). Implicitly, these goods would help to form the basis of a new conjugal family,
which would not be entirely under the control of the senior generation.
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Economy
It can be seen from the above illustrations that economy, our third axis, is closely linked
with the marriage system in both cases. Both in Carnia and in Hakkari, the management
of commons was corollary to solidarity as a village unit (Carnia) or as a tribal unit
(Hakkari). In the latter case, tribal pastures were the central common property, for which
ownership was customarily deﬁned as tribal lands (and legally held by the state), but
use rights were collectively managed and strongly protected. In fact, the collective protec-
tion of ‘traditional’ tribal pastures (which were central to the herding economy at the time)
made the backbone of and the only reason for collective tribal action. In no other circum-
stances would the whole tribe come together.
At the time of ﬁeldwork in Sisin the economy was strongly relying on semi-nomadic
sheep and goat herding, supplemented with intensive agriculture of terraced ﬁelds in
the villages. The pastures and hay cutting areas were claimed and managed by the
tribe. The usage rights were distributed along the sublineages and managed collectively
by households belonging to these sublineages. The terraced ﬁelds and land for building
houses, however, were given by the government in the 1940s and became individual
property to be inherited among male descendants. With population increase and
limited availability of cultivable land, the need for cooperation between tribal villages
was met partly by keeping the rule of endogamy within the tribe and exchanging wives
between tribal villages. Even if women were not equals and hence did not have use or
inheritance rights to pastures, aﬃnal ties through women often played a role in securing
peace and/or access to pasture and camping grounds.
At the time of ﬁeldwork in Carnia the village commons, and the economic system of
which it had been part, no longer had much practical signiﬁcance. The tipping point in
this process of economic change occurred in the early 1970s. But the earlier system,
and the role within it of common village property, had been living realities until that
time – and so it was possible to reconstruct how the system had worked by speaking
with middle-aged and older informants.
The economic situation in Carnia before the 1970s was not unlike that in Hakkari,
though several diﬀerences are worth noting. In Carnia, forestry was as much of an econ-
omic resource as cattle raising, and until the eighteenth century both the forests and the
high pastures had been the collective property of individual villages (Bianco 1985). Ovasta
was one of a minority of local villages in which this was still the case – though other vil-
lages as well maintained some informal use rights in their former commons. Just as impor-
tant as common lands was a tradition of collective enterprise. Almost every village had its
own cooperative dairy for processing the milk into cheese and selling on some of the
product to outside traders. Many also had commonly run stalls in which the village
cattle were kept during the winter. Gathering ﬁrewood and maintaining paths to the
high pastures were also managed as collective village tasks – as was keeping the roads
free of snow during the winter.
Nevertheless, despite the importance of collective resources and activities, each family
was also its own business unit – both in Carnia and Hakkari. In Carnia this involved harvest-
ing hay and vegetables from its own land, keeping its own animals, and also drawing a good
deal of income from some family members’ participation in the monetary economy –
whether as local forestry workers or sawmill operators, or as seasonal emigrants.
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In Hakkari successful household management involved managing the herd size, con-
trolling male and female labour within the household, and controlling marriage strategies.
The economy of mountain villages in Hakkari had limited use of money, which was
acquired from the sale of butter and sheep wool, also of sheep when there were major
expenses. Otherwise, subsistence economy dominated in the early 1980s. All agricultural
produce was either used by the household and/or bartered with wheat and vegetables
grown in plains villages. Goods and products which were not produced by households
(consumption goods as well as household and construction goods, gadgets, and simple
machines) were bought by money, either from the local markets or smuggled across
the Turkish Iraqi border. Despite all these economic relationships with townsmen and agri-
culturalist villagers, marrying into town or non-tribal agriculturalists or taking wives from
them was very rare.12
In both places village families were trying to maintain a reasonable living standard
(given the expectations of those days) but their economic eﬀorts also had social meanings.
Economic achievement was also important for the family’s social position in the village as a
whole. In Carnia it was (and is) important to have a house that looked good, but also to
keep one’s ﬁelds neat and tidy and to keep up with the neighbours in starting and com-
pleting each season’s agricultural tasks. In both places, men strove to accumulate social
and economic capital through strategical successful household management. The posses-
sion of rights in a home, and of the land needed to support a family, was crucial for male
status – and for this reason houses were transmitted exclusively to sons.
But this competition, though intense, was not unlimited. Economic cooperation in cul-
tivating and herding were important reasons to stick together instead of distinguishing
oneself from others (for Kurds cf. Leach 1940, 21). People took turns working together
on each other’s land – and it was also important to help out people in particular need
without calculating an immediate return. Looking back, people in Carnia saw this as a
time of both competition and solidarity in which no-one – except for a few rich families
(one or two in each village) – was much better than anyone else. This attitude aﬀected
the way that middle-aged and older people around 1990 viewed the behaviour of
younger people who, because of the rapid decline of agriculture during the previous
two decades, no longer helped out much in the ﬁelds. The older people thought their
juniors considered themselves superior – ‘like rich people’ – no longer willing to join in
the egalitarian work relationships that had been central to their parents’ lives (cf. Bailey
1971 ‘competing to remain equal’). Indeed, cooperation was central to the continuance
of the village as a social and reproductive unit. In Carnia, once the collective pressure to
cooperate on commons diminished, people also stopped marrying within the same
village – conﬁrming that endogamy, cooperation, and the sense of equality were comp-
lementary aspects of a single social system.
Military activities
Our ﬁnal axis concerns military life. In both Carnia and Hakkari, the practice of conscription
had been incorporated into local folklore as both a masculine rite of passage and an
aﬃrmation of the on-going vigour of the community as a whole. In Carnia, many family
homes displayed photos of their sons or fathers in the uniforms of the mountain infantry
(Alpini) or mountain artillery: regiments whose traditions and uniforms celebrated their
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own mountain identity. Conscription was also incorporated into the symbolism of the
annual ceremony in which the young men asserted their ritual control of courtship.
They became eligible for membership of the young men’s group once they had
reached the age of military service and attained the status of ‘coscrits’ (conscripts).
In Hakkari, military conscription meant serving in the Turkish army, which was seen as a
rite de passage and was also a process of experiencing one’s own male and Kurdish iden-
tity outside the tribal area. Similar to Carnia, young conscripts (who were called to service
as cohorts) left together after visiting all the village households and saying farewell and
receiving money gifts; on their return they again visited all the village households and
were welcomed with money gifts, resonating very much van Gennep’s description of sep-
aration and integration in rites of passage. Young men, therefore, were ﬁrst separated from
the village and tribal community of equals and were ritually re-integrated as adult men
upon their arrival. Their military experience – like in Carnia – was later commemorated
with their formal pictures in uniform hung on each household’s home.
It might seem, therefore, that the local community was dependent on the state in this
crucial symbolic respect – and there is clearly some truth in this idea. However, there is
another implication that is equally important: that the local community is itself a society
of soldiers, capable, if necessary, of independent military action. This is plainly the case
in Hakkari, whose rather lawless recent history has often involved local communities in
military action (cf. Leach 1940, 55). In Hakkari, the prime military unit is the multi-village
tribe which, unlike the village, is more strictly endogamous. Indeed, the need to maintain
marriage links between diﬀerent villages within the same tribal area may explain why indi-
vidual villages are only partly endogamous.
Carnia has no social unit corresponding to the tribe – and the greater degree of state
control than in south-east Anatolia has usually meant that there was less scope for purely
local military action. Nevertheless, there is a sense of shared Carnian unity, and when – in
the closing phase of the Second World War – the opportunity arose for local military
action, the Carnians took it: declaring their independence from the German and
Fascist authorities, and maintaining this independence for several months (Angeli and
Candotti 1971).
Extending Goody’s argument
Our underlying aim in reporting this ‘natural experiment’ was to identify causal links
between endogamy and other socio-economic factors, which might have been missed
by the model set out in Table 1. We were looking in the ﬁrst instance for factors which
could explain the presence of endogamy in societies without diverging devolution. Our
hope was that the factors we identiﬁed would not be restricted to such societies, and
would improve the general explanatory and predictive power of Goody’s model in
other societies as well. So in the discussion that follows we will consider both local
eﬀects and the possibility that the eﬀects might be relevant more widely.
The ﬁrst step, which is the theme of this section, is to identify the factors concerned, and
review the range of their potential eﬀects. The second step, which will be tackled in the
next full section, is to formulate these eﬀects as a theoretical model. The third step is to
apply this model to Goody’s historical account, and outline how the revised version can
be checked against statistical data in the same way as Goody’s own analysis in PAR.
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The functional importance of endogamous kinship ties
Perhaps the most striking ﬁnding to emerge from our natural experiment is the practical
and symbolic importance of the sense of shared kinship in both Hakkari and Carnia – not
just for individual behaviour and family organization but also as the basis for collective
action within and between local communities. The actions concerned include
. peace-keeping within the local community
. organizing access to and maintenance of common lands and other collective resources
. local defence.
These forms of joint action provide an environment in which the main way of achieving
status is peaceful agricultural work and the accumulation of wealth.
Endogamy is closely related to the sense of mutual relatedness. Indeed, in Carnia local
marriage ties are celebrated as the main basis of shared kinship. Although this is not the
case in Hakkari, where local unity is understood primarily in terms of shared patrilineal
descent, the point that stands out in both places is that endogamy is seen as a natural con-
sequence and conﬁrmation of the value attached to local kinship ties.
These ﬁndings may help to ﬁll the gaps in Goody’s statistical model. The main statistical
problem that we noted earlier with the model in Table 1, was that ‘In-Marriage’ was more
strongly correlated with the variables ‘Male Farming’ and ‘Complex Polity’ than could be
explained by the indirect connection through ‘Diverging Devolution’ which was all that
was allowed for in Goody’s model. The ﬁnding that endogamy limits conﬂict and enhances
social cohesion and belonging, may help to explain its empirical association with political
development. Combined with the resulting tendency for men to focus their status-seeking
eﬀorts on economic work, these results might enable us to add direct connections
between ‘In-Marriage’ and ‘Male Farming’ to the causal model in Table 1.
Function, causation and strategy
But establishing the functional importance of the sense of shared kinship is not the same
as explaining how it arises – or at least not entirely. Function and cause may be closely
linked – if the reason why a particular social arrangement or set of symbols is adopted
by the members of a community is that they believe it will bring them practical
beneﬁts. The adoption of the symbolism, or the fact, of in-marriage could then be
explained as a deliberate strategy.
This interpretation is supported by the changes in Carnian social life since the 1960s –
though in this case the strategic nature of collective kinship practices was indicated by the
timing of their abandonment. As we noted above, the decline in the practical importance
of local agriculture, and the practical cooperation it involved, was accompanied by a sharp
fall in village endogamy (which was followed by some weakening of the symbolism of
local relatedness). The diﬀerences between the kinship systems of Hakkari and Carnia
may also be explained as the outcome of strategic choices. The greater emphasis on patri-
lineal organization in Hakkari is consistent with the semi-nomadic economy, in which the
need to protect the family herds may have favoured close cooperative ties between
related males.
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But strategic explanations, though entirely valid, can only take us so far. They explain
when kinship solidarity is likely to be invoked, but not why shared kinship is associated
with solidarity in the ﬁrst place.
Theorising the power of kinship: Axioms of identity and amity
This question is, of course, fundamental to any kind of kinship theory – and it is remarkable
how similar are the answers proposed by diﬀerent theoretical schools. Cultural anthropol-
ogists (Sahlins 2013; Schneider 1980), evolutionary biologists (Hamilton 2006; Hughes
1988), and social anthropologists (Fortes 2006 [1969]) all agree that kinship is a kind of
shared identity which carries with it a presumption (other things being equal) of mutual
solidarity. Fortes’s formulation of his ‘axiom of kinship amity’ is particularly helpful as he
makes it clear that the identity concerned is not just a matter of genealogical connected-
ness but of the ways in which genealogical connections are classiﬁed in the society con-
cerned (with classiﬁcatory relatives counting as kin just as clearly as those with a close
genealogical connection).
This theoretical consensus suggests that it might be possible to base an explanation of
endogamy on the idea of kinship identity and amity. But, before we do that, there is a
major diﬃculty that has to be faced and overcome: the range of people covered by the
sense of kinship amity is culturally variable, and in many societies it does not include rela-
tives by marriage. Fortes makes the point in a particularly forceful way. Citing the wide-
spread saying that ‘we marry those whom we ﬁght’ he comments that ‘It is as though
marriage and warfare are thought of as two aspects of a single constellation the direct con-
trary of which is kinship and amity’ (Fortes 2006, 234). He notes that ‘The opposition of
kinship and aﬃnity is most conspicuous in structural arrangements, as well as in moral
and jural norms, in societies with exogamous unilineal descent groups’ including the Gha-
naian Tallensi with whom he worked (Fortes 2006, 235).
Less dramatically, but consistently with this, Goody also notes that marriage in sub-
Saharan Africa does not carry the connotations of social equivalence that it usually has
in Mediterranean and Eurasian societies (Goody 1976, 101–103). It is all quite diﬀerent
from the solidarity-inducing relationships associated with endogamous marriage in the
circum-Mediterranean area.
This leaves us with the question: why does the sense of kinship identity (and the soli-
darity it entails) exclude aﬃnes in sub-Saharan Africa, but include them in much of Eurasia?
This is the crucial diﬀerence which makes endogamy a meaningful option in Mediterra-
nean and Eurasian societies. In the next section we will argue that – despite the limitations
of the model in Table 1 – the explanation does indeed have quite a lot to do with property.
Property, identity and work
Goody’s original explanation of the causal pathway from the division of labour in column
(2) to the marriage systems in column (4) of Table 1 centred on the distribution of property.
The explanation that we are developing now depends on the distribution and implications
of the sense kinship identity. But something like Goody’s proposed causal connection
might still apply if the distributions of property and identity were closely connected. It
would work best if property and identity were actually equivalent. Although this idea is
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not included in Goody’s formal model, or directly stated anywhere else in PAR, it does
seem to be implicit in much of Goody’s discussion. In this section we will try to develop
the idea in an explicit way, and work out some of its causal implications.
The basic thought would probably make sense to people in Carnia – if not as an explicit
statement, then at least as a guiding idea. When asked why houses were left to sons and
not to daughters, an old man replied that sons carried on the family name. In another con-
versation, someone remarked that so-and-so’s house (cjasa in the local speech) had come
to end – meaning by this that none of his most recent descendants in the male line, who
had been geographically quite scattered, had themselves fathered sons. Cjasa (like the
Italian words casa and casato) links three ideas: the physical building, the group of
people who live in it, and the male descent-line which issues from it (exactly in the
same way as the Kurdish usage of mal, as house, household and descent group) – thus
referencing a sense of identity that is simultaneously social, biological and material,
hence property based. This semantic combination, which is also reported by Just (2000)
in Greece, seems to be characteristic of southern Europe.
The idea of an equivalence between property, identity and biological descent is also
found in Africa. In fact it underlies the social meaning of bride-price. Although Goody dis-
cusses bride-price at length in Goody and Tambiah (1973), it is only mentioned brieﬂy in
PAR, where he writes that bride-price payments legitimate the status of children as
members of the father’s patrilineage (Goody 1976, 8). This remark is true, but somewhat
understated. Ethnographies of African kinship unanimously stress that in patrilineal
systems the function of bride-price payments is to cancel the potential identity of children
with their mother’s clan, and transfer it to the clan of their father. This is pithily expressed
by the southern African saying that cattle (usually the main component of African bride-
price payments) beget children (Comaroﬀ 1980; Goody 1976; Kuper 1982; Tambiah 1989).
The association of buildings with the property-based transmission of patrilineal identity is
also found, since African homesteads are often built around the cattle byre (Kuper 1982).
Similar points can be made about dowry. Although Goody’s discussion of the conse-
quences of diverging devolution focuses on the property itself, and how it can be kept
within the social group, one of the motives he oﬀers for diverging devolution is the
need to preserve the class status of the family by ensuring that its daughters marry
well. In eﬀect he is suggesting that property is being used to purchase social identity.
So it is very widely true that property conveys a sense of identity which can be com-
bined with, or exchanged for, identities derived from the biological parents. But what
exactly is the parental contribution to this combined identity? There are some indications
that what makes a diﬀerence in this context is not the biological connection of shared sub-
stance – which can perhaps be assumed – but the amount of energy or work that each
parent contributes to the material well-being of the household.
In Carnia, the connection between property, work and kinship identity emerges from
some of things that people say. It was considered very shameful for a man to move
into the house of his wife’s family. In such cases the man was said to have married ‘in
cuc’ – as a cuckoo – the implication being that he was depositing his children in some-
one else’s nest, when he should have provided the nest himself, either by building or
paying for his own dwelling or by bringing his bride to live with him in his parental
home. From this perspective, male work and property inheritance operate in the same
way – as an aﬃrmation that the new family takes its main identity from the husband.
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The wife, who retains her own family identity, is referred to as living in the family of the
husband. (Thus if Maria Timeus married Edoardo Gortan, she would be referred to as
Maria Timeus in Gortan; the couple’s children will have the family name Gortan.) The iden-
tity of the new family with the dwelling provided by the husband is very clear, but the
family’s social identity does not depend on his work alone. This is made clear by a
popular saying that the ‘wife is three corners of the house’ (‘la femina a je tre cjantons
da cjasa’), which people explain by referring both to the importance of the wife’s moral
character and to the amount of work she does – Carnian women (much like senior
woman in the household (kabani) in Sisin, Hakkari) were expected to make a full contri-
bution to the agricultural labour on which the family depended for its subsistence. The
house – as an identity-bearing unit – depends almost as much on her provisioning
work, as on the property-providing work role of the man. The moral signiﬁcance of
work emerges also from the rhetoric of work as self-sacriﬁce, which both parents are
prone to invoke as a basis for their authority over their children and grandchildren.
Both property and work are forms of material provision which carry with them impli-
cations of identity and authority. In the next section we will argue that this equivalence is
not a cultural particularity of our own ﬁeld sites, but reﬂects a universal principle which
emerges just as clearly from the African data: namely that both forms of material provision
are understood as gifts – in the Maussian sense that they convey both identity and the
expectation of solidarity (Mauss 1970 [1954]). Though the principle is universal its impli-
cations vary – depending on the economic roles of each sex, and the property transfers
that take place between the generations and between the families of the bride and groom.
In the following section we will draw on these ideas, in an attempt to rework Goody’s
original argument on Maussian lines.
A Maussian reformulation of Goody’s model
We will present the revised model in four parts. The ﬁrst part deﬁnes some terms and
assumptions. The second part deals with micro-level interactions – analysing the trans-
actions involved in each marriage, and the diﬀerent patterns of property and identity
which they can generate. The third part deals with macro-level analysis, looking at the
implications of these same patterns for overall systems of kinship and social solidarity.
The ﬁnal part discusses ways in which these identity-based relationships interact with
the economic and political considerations which also aﬀect the transmission of property,
the choice of marriage partners and the practical signiﬁcance of collective kinship ties.
Material provision as a Maussian gift – Deﬁnitions and assumptions
We will start by deﬁning our terms, and stating some assumptions. Bymaterial provision
we mean any action that contributes to the material well-being of a person or group. The
actions in question might be productive work, a transfer of property, or allowing the reci-
pient to share an important resource, such as a house or land.
By gift we mean an action by a donor which beneﬁts a recipient in some deﬁnite way
and which also creates a social connection between the donor and recipient. This connec-
tion involves mutual solidarity, and creates a debt. One implication of this debt is that the
recipient takes on (wholly or partly) the social identity of the donor (including collective
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identities such as clan membership). These relationships only hold for unreciprocated
gifts. Repayment of the gift – at the time or later – eliminates the debt, and cancels the
relationship between the donor and recipient.
We assume that all acts of material provision carried out by relatives are understood as
gifts. Donors and recipients can be individual people, but they can also be social units such
as conjugal families or lineages. The transfers of identity that result from gifts do not just
aﬀect the individuals or units directly involved, but also their relationships to others who
share the same collective identities.
Micro-relationships: The triadic transactions involved in each marriage
We now apply these deﬁnitions to some social choices that are relevant for Goody’s argu-
ment. The ﬁrst of these choices – between patrilineal or matrilineal succession – is not
dealt with directly in PAR; but it forms the background to much of the discussion, which
implicitly assumes patrilineal succession. We therefore include it here.
Any marriage involves three conjugal families: the new family of reproduction formed
by the union of the husband and wife, and the separate families of origin of the husband
and of the wife. In nearly all kinship systems the new family is more closely associated with
just one of the original families – inheriting its family name, or some similar symbolic
marker, which shows that they share a common lineage identity. We argue that the
sense of shared lineage identity follows from the gift relationships which are set up by
the processes of material provision.
Where provision comes mainly from the husband’s side – in the form either of the hus-
band’s own productive work or of property provided by his parents or relatives – the new
family will be most strongly associated with his family of origin, resulting in patriliny. On
the other hand, if the provision by the husband and his relatives is outweighed by the
material contribution provided by the wife and her relatives – the debt to the wife’s
side will be greater, resulting in the matrilineal transmission of social identity. The
crucial point is that the direction of lineage aﬃliation depends on the relative strength
of the gift relationships with the respective families of origin.
We now come to a point which is central to Goody’s thesis in PAR, and to our Maussian
reformulation of his argument: the famous phenomenon of diverging devolution, the
fact that intergenerational transfers of property do not always coincide with the relation-
ship of named lineage succession. We extend Goody’s discussion of diverging devolution
in three ways: by including the other aspect of material provision – namely the work of the
married partners; by including property transfers to, as well as from, the family of the in-
marrying spouse (i.e. bride-price payments in case of patrilineal societies); and by taking
full account of the accompanying transmission of inherited identities (which Goody
seems to have had in mind, but largely omitted from the discussion of the model in
Table 1).
The key point is that, even if the inherited property was transmitted in a non-diverging
way (i.e. entirely from the husband’s family of origin, in the case of patrilineal succession)
there will still be a debt to the wife’s original family, on account of her productive work,
which means that the new family will also be partly identiﬁed with her family of origin
and therefore (despite inheriting the paternal name) the social identity of the new
family will actually be somewhat mixed. In other words, even where property is inherited
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unilinearly, the inheritance of identity will diverge to some extent- bringing with it an on-
going connection between the lineages of the husband and wife. This is the case in our
own examples of Hakkari and Carnia.
However, it is possible to ensure the purely patrilineal, non-diverging inheritance of iden-
tity if the husband (or his original family) pays enough bride-price to compensate the wife’s
original family for the value of her productive contribution to the new family unit – thus
eﬀectively removing any identity connection between aﬃnal relatives. Something like
this appears to ﬁt the African ethnographic accounts that we cited earlier. Payments of
dowry, from the bride’s side to the groom’s side, would have the opposite eﬀect – strength-
ening aﬃnal ties and further weakening the sense of patrilineal identity. This is the situation
that Goody considers characteristic of Mediterranean societies and of Eurasia in general.
(The absence of dowry in Hakkari and the minimal level of dowry payments in Carnia
maymean that aﬃnal ties are weaker in Hakkari and Carnia than in Mediterranean commu-
nities in which dowry is paid. But another interpretation would be that women’s labouring
role is more pronounced in these highland communities than elsewhere,13 and that this
eﬀectively compensates for the lack of dowry. The key point for social and political organ-
ization is that, in both highland and lowland Mediterranean societies, the separate or com-
bined eﬀects of thewife’s provider role and of any dowry payments is to ensure that families
inherit some of their social identity from the wife’s side of the family.)
In emphasizing the inheritance of identity we do not mean to downplay the importance
of the material transactions for the individuals and families concerned, or to deny that
environmental conditions and the gender implications of particular technologies may
play some role in setting the pattern of property transmission. But it is clear that there
is a good deal of free-play in the system, and that the resulting patterns of lineal or diver-
ging identity owe as much to the social arrangements of property transmission as to tech-
nical constraints on the gendered division of labour.
Macro-level relationships: Marriage and the structuring of kin-based
communities
The ways in which identity is transmitted have major implications for the structure of col-
lective identities and the pattern of marriages in society as a whole. Lineal transmission of
identity (for instance by patrilineal inheritance of property combined with bride-price pay-
ments which repay the value of the wife’s productive work) would be compatible with a
situation in which the society is permanently divided into a set of exogamous unilineal
clans which, although they exchange marriage partners, do not share a common
kinship identity. In such a system kinship amity could not be used as a basis for overall
social cohesion or for shared loyalty to state structures.
Diverging devolution of identity (for instance in patrilineal systems where there are
dowry payments or where wives make substantial productive contributions which are
not cancelled out by bride-price payments) would not be compatible with a system of
mutually independent lineages, since each marriage would result in a blurring of the orig-
inal identities, and to cross-cutting loyalties which would undermine the practical eﬀec-
tiveness of unilineal ties. However, there are two ways in which this blurring of ties
could be avoided. One would be to marry endogamously within the clan or local group
– since then both the husband and wife would share the same identities. The other
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would be to focus the sense of collective identity on the society as a whole – which would
have the same eﬀect.
Because they involve unions between partners who are in some respect alike, both
these strategies can be described as homogamous. Though they diﬀer in the genealogical
and spatial range of the marriage ties they create, both strategies would result in social
ﬁelds without any conspicuous divide between kin and aﬃnes – in which the rhetoric
of kinship amity could be used to support coordinated action by the community as a
whole. They can be contrasted with the allogamous systems created by the existence
of mutually independent exogamous clans which, regardless of the geographic scale,
always result in social ﬁelds that are divided between kin and potential aﬃnes – in
which the latter are socially deﬁned as strangers, with whom the ties of solidarity, if
any, are correspondingly weak.
Identity and strategy
The previous subsections have described how social identities are shaped by, and also
help to determine, the choice of marriage partners and the property and labour trans-
actions involved in setting up new families. But as we have seen, those same trans-
actions – of marriage, labour provision and property transmission – can also be
analyzed in terms of economic and political strategies designed to maximize the
material prosperity and status of the people involved. Although, in the theoretical litera-
ture these perspectives are sometimes presented as mutually exclusive, the fact that
both have received solid empirical support suggests that in many (perhaps all) societies
it is common for local people to adopt both perspectives – with the particular emphasis
depending on the social context involved. The crucial problem, both for theorists and for
local people themselves, is not how to choose between strategic and identity-based per-
spectives, but how to integrate them, so that social choices make sense from both
perspectives.
There are two main points at which the identity-based and strategic perspectives inter-
sect and inﬂuence each other.
One concerns the payments involved in setting up new families. Bride-price can be
seen both as cancelling the aﬃnal link (in an identity perspective), and as a payment
made in exchange for the wife’s future productive contribution (in Boserup’s economic
version of the strategic perspective). Similarly diverging devolution can be seen both as
an aﬃrmation of the identity connection between kin and aﬃnes (in an identity perspec-
tive) and as a strategic payment (by the bride’s family) in exchange for the economic
support that she will receive from her future husband. It is likely that the system as a
whole will be most stable when the payments make sense from both points of view.
This would tend to produce the correspondences between economic gender roles, mar-
riage transactions, and marriage patterns set out in Table 3.
Table 3. Predicted combinations of gender roles, marriage transactions and marriage rules in stable
systems.
Economic gender roles Marriage transactions Marriage rules
PATTERN 1 Women more productive Bride-price Allogamy
PATTERN 2 Men more productive Diverging Devolution Homogamy
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The other point at which identity and strategy intersect concerns the form taken by
homogamous marriage – whether or not its solidarity building potential is used to
enhance the cohesion of local communities, leading to local endogamy in the full
sense; whether a particular need for male solidarity leads to patrilineal endogamy; or
whether it operates horizontally, dividing society as a whole into distinct social classes.
These issues loomed large in the ethnographic section of this paper. They take us
beyond the formal simplicities of theoretical model building, and pose the vital question
of whether, and how far, our Maussian reworking of Goody’s model helps to account for
the historical developments and geographic diﬀerences that he was trying to explain.
Applying and evaluating the revised model
Rethinking the historical sequence
Goody intended the model set out in Table 1 to reﬂect both the causal order of the vari-
ables concerned, and the temporal sequence in which they appeared. It depicted a move-
ment which started with the advent of advanced agriculture, and then proceeded in a top-
down fashion through the advent of state structures, the implementation of these
methods in male agriculture, the consequent adjustments to property transmission
leading to daughters receiving a substantial share, and ﬁnally the adoption of in-marriage
to prevent this female share being lost to the social group.
Table 4 sets out a revised version of the temporal sequence which would be consistent
with our own data and with the revised ‘Maussian’ causal model which we developed in
the previous section. It is not a complete break: as with Table 1, social arrangements are
seen to respond to economic changes. But there are major diﬀerences. For one thing, the
order of events is diﬀerent. Table 4 starts small, with a change in gendered work patterns,
leading on to a system of endogamous local communities (recorded in column 3), which
sets the scene for a cumulative process of expansion and economic intensiﬁcation (in
column 4), which eventuates in a system of hierarchical states and a tendency to class
endogamy (in column 5).
This process of cumulative development is surely more realistic than the sequence set
out in Table 1. But it is not just the order which diﬀers: the mechanisms diﬀer as well. Both
tables feature a sequence leading from male farming, through diverging devolution to in-
marriage (columns 2–4 in Table 1, and columns 1–3 in Table 4); and in both tables the ﬁrst
step in the sequence (from male farming to devolution) depends on the pragmatic
Table 4. Revised version of Goody’s ‘Eurasian’ historical sequence (cf. Table 1).
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motives outlined by Boserup – but what happens next is fundamentally diﬀerent. In the
Maussian version what matters is that the shift in property transmission leads to the diver-
ging devolution of identity, which opens the way to homogamous marriage and a general
pattern of cooperation based on a common kinship identity. The fact that this leads to
marriages within the same, or with nearby, local communities is not due to a strategy
of hoarding property, but because these are the people with whom cooperation is impor-
tant within what are still small-scale economies which depend on the shared use of
common local resources.
We have taken our own ﬁeld sites as examples of the social processes involved, showing
that they channel social competition towards economic development andhence to the kind
of intensiﬁcation processes that would in the past have led to the processes of economic
and social change depicted in columns 4 and 5. Indeed the need (as they saw it) to
defend the local community from the risk of absorption into the wider society, and from
the development of class stratiﬁcation were among the reasons which local people gave
for endogamous marriage and for the avoidance of marriage payments. In Carnia this
process of socio-economic transition was already far advanced at the time of ﬁeldwork.
The reason was, as we have seen, that the economic basis of Carnian agriculture had col-
lapsed. As this example shows, there is no fundamental conﬂict between a Maussian prop-
erty-and-identity perspective and a Goody-Boserup economic-strategy approach, once we
realize that inheritance and marriage transactions – and the strategic calculations which
guide them – must always take account of both aspects. We believe that a combined ana-
lytic approach has the best chance of making sense of the political economy of kin relation-
ships in particular societies. It may also provide the best prospect for understanding the
(pre)historical processes that led to the establishment of class-stratiﬁed state societies.
The need for empirical validation
Our decision to base an argument about intercontinental diﬀerences and long-term his-
torical trends very largely on data from two particular highland societies (which are them-
selves peripheral to the regions – circum-Mediterranean and Eurasian – which we have
used them to represent) clearly raises questions about the validity of our conclusions.
What right have we to develop the theoretical implications of two case studies of endo-
gamy (or as we would now prefer to write ‘locally focused homogamy’) in this way? In miti-
gation we would argue that we are hardly the ﬁrst anthropologists to argue from the
particular to the general, and that we have drawn extensively on other ethnographic
data, as well as on theoretical works.
Ultimately, though, the value of conclusions derived from special cases can only be
heuristic. Inference about large regions, or historical periods – let alone claims concerning
universal mechanisms, such as those we make in our Maussian model – must be based as
far as possible on data that is fully representative. That is why PAR’s statistical analysis of
Ethnographic Atlas data is so important, and the question that arises is whether we can test
our own conclusions in the same way. We think that we can.
If the arguments presented here are correct, we would actually expect a better ﬁt to the
statistical data than was achieved by Goody’s statistical model. The improvement should
show up particularly strongly if the statistical variables were modiﬁed to reﬂect the theor-
etical discussion in the last few paragraphs. (Relevant changes would be: to allow for the
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presence or absence of bride-price in deﬁning the diverging inheritance variable so that it
reﬂects the inheritance of identity; and to clarify the diﬀerence between homogamy and
endogamy (and their respective contraries, allogamy and exogamy) since Goody’s ‘in-mar-
riage’ variable confounds the two conceptual dimensions (see Appendix 1, Table A1). It
might also be possible to add statistical checks for associations between inheritance
and marriage strategies and measures of conﬂictuality and violence). We plan to carry
out these analyses, and to present our ﬁndings in a later article.
Conclusion – Goody and the mechanics of social reproduction
As well as being a big-picture man, Goody was interested in the detailed mechanics of
social reproduction and organization; and what makes PAR almost unique in anthropolo-
gical literature is the way it combines these two perspectives. Much of what Goody wrote
in PARwould have been consistent with the argument developed here. The diﬀerence is in
the way he speciﬁed the mechanics of the system. He saw these as driven by competition
for property and social status. We have added the dimension of social identity and the
deliberate creation of amity, arguing on Maussian lines that practical interactions generate
relationships of identity, which feed back into the socio-political relations of production. In
other words, we see identity as part of the mechanics of the system.
Why did Goody himself not take this view? We agree with Hann that his ‘resolute mate-
rialism’ had a lot to do with it. But even more important was the motive which underlay his
materialism. This was his search for the processes of causation which generated and dis-
tinguished diﬀerent social systems. Though not himself a Marxist, Goody had absorbed the
Marxian infrastructure/superstructure framework (Table 1 simply lays this vertical ordering
on its side). This view was widely shared, and the idea that kinship identities and marriage
exchange were part of the ideological superstructure inﬂuenced the way they were ana-
lyzed by other authors writing at about that time (Bloch 1975; Bloch and Sperber 2004;
Parry 1986). The implicit assumption was that, although ideology had real eﬀects on
people’s lives, it was not the moving force which shaped and transformed societies.
Since then a Geertzian view of kinship has put identity centre-stage, but has seen the
transactions involved as systems of almost pure meaning (Carsten 2000; Comaroﬀ 1980).
Writers in this ‘new kinship’ tradition have emphasised the importance for identity of most
of the elements that we have considered here, including the house (Carsten and Hugh-
Jones 1995), ideas about agricultural production, biological relatedness and the work of
nurturing (Bamford and Leach 2009; Carsten 1997), and the exchangeability of property
and biological descent (Strathern 1990). However, because they do not look at the econ-
omic determinants and consequences of these meaningful interactions, they are unable to
explain the distribution of the systems they describe over space and time.
The Maussian approach developed here draws these identity-transactions back into the
system of causal relationships. We think that Goody would have approved.
Notes
1. With Eurasia we mean the entire landmass of Europe (including the circum-Mediterranean
region of north Africa) and Asia since the urban revolutions of the Bronze Age, in the sense
Goody (2010) has been using the term.
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2. Table 1 is based on the diagram on page 38 of PAR. We have omitted variables that are not
directly relevant to the theme of this article.
3. Goody deﬁnes advanced agriculture as a condition which allows an individual to produce
more than he/she can consume, be it through the use of plough or irrigation, being charac-
teristic of Eurasian societies (1976, 20ﬀ).
4. The number of societies included in the Ethnographic Atlas has been steadily growing in the
decades since Goody wrote (Gray 1999). This is the number included in the version that Goody
used.
5. These conclusions can also be deduced directly from the correlation coeﬃcients between ‘in-
marriage’ and the other four variables, shown in the ﬁnal column of Table 2. The correlation
coeﬃcients with ‘complex polity` and ‘male farming’ are about the same as the correlation
with ‘diverging devolution’. If the only link between these two variables and ‘in-marriage’
was the indirect one through ‘diverging devolution’, their coeﬃcients would be much smaller.
6. The particular tribe mentioned here in the 1980s had been settled in a mountainous region of
about 400 sq.km. and a rough estimate of the tribe’s population was around 3–4 thousand
people (Yalçın-Heckmann 2000).
7. The Hakkari Kurds have categories for relatives by patrilineal descent (xwîn/waris) and also
aﬃnes/matrilateral kin (xism). Because of the practice of FBD marriage (or more generally mar-
riage within the patrilineal descent group), membership of these categories overlap. Both cat-
egories overlap with residence in the same village. In practice the preferred partner choice is
with someone who is closely connected in one or more of these three ways (descent, aﬃnity,
residence).
8. Leach (1940, 19–20) describing endogamy within the patrilineal clan (taifa) notes that ‘all
[within the tribe] call one another “amoza”’, a term for FB’s children, the southern Kurdish
equivalent of pismam.
9. Altuntek (2006) argues, for example, that among the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia women were
very important for linking patrilineages and the relations to MBs were institutionalized. For
similar arguments on the role of aﬃnal relations in patrilineal societies, see Khuri 1970.
10. ‘Generalized’ in the sense that sons and daughters from any household can choose their
partner from any other – not in Lévi-Strauss’s sense of repeated asymmetric exchange
between the same lineages.
11. Bride-price was a common practice in most of non-tribal, exogamous, and prestige marriages.
12. This is a point also made in early research on Kurds, especially by Leach (1940) and Barth (1954).
13. The equal participation by women that we have described contrasts with Ethnographic Atlas
ﬁgures which show predominantly male farming in 65 percent of circum-Mediterranean
societies (PAR page 131 Table 21).
14. The number of societies included in the Ethnographic Atlas has been steadily growing in the
decades since Goody wrote (Gray 1999). This is the number included in the version that
Goody used.
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Appendix: Deﬁnitions of Goody’s Statistical Variables
In Production and Reproduction (1976, henceforth PAR) Goody develops a statistical path-analysis
argument – which relates to functional consistency between diﬀerent social features in the ethno-
graphic present, and to the multi-stage causal relationships which these imply. The evidence comes
from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967) which is a data-base, compiled from ethnogra-
phies and historical accounts, of codes representing selected characteristics of 86314 societies. In
order to test this Goody and his research team used the Ethnographic Atlas (henceforth EA) data
to generate several binary (‘yes/no’) variables. As Goody points out, the way the variables are
deﬁned depends both on his own theoretical aims and on the data that was actually available in
the Ethnographic Atlas. Two of them call for particular explanation – because they are central to
his argument.
The ﬁrst of these variables records the presence or absence of ‘diverging devolution’ – a term
invented by Goody to describe inheritance systems in which both sons and daughters can inherit
some of the property of their natal family. As explained on page 12 of PAR, the operational
version of this variable includes
. all societies in which daughters inherit a share of either land or movable property
. all societies with dowry as the main or alternative method of marriage transaction.
The second variable is ‘in-marriage’ – which Goody uses as the measure of endogamy in his most
developed statistical model. Goody’s basic idea is to include societies in which there is a deﬁnite pre-
ference for marriages between people who resemble each other socially – whether in terms of
locality, kinship or status. In a footnote to Table 13, page 127 of PAR, Goody lists the Ethnographic
Atlas variables and codes which were used to construct the operational version. Table A1 below
sets out the operational deﬁnition in detail. It lists the EA variables (aka ‘columns’) and codes con-
cerned, along with the deﬁnitions provided by Murdock (1967).
Although Goody’s concept includes a preference for marriage within the same social class, this is
not included in the deﬁnition of the operational variable.






Local Column 19, code D ‘communities revealing a marked tendency toward local
endogamy but not segmented into clan-barrios’
Kinship Column 25, codes Q,D,F;
Column 26, code A
Preference for marriage with father’s brother’s daughter
Caste stratiﬁcation Column 69, Codes C, E ‘C Complex caste stratiﬁcation in which occupational
diﬀerentiation emphasizes hereditary ascription and
endogamy to the near exclusion of achievable class
statuses’.
‘E Ethnic stratiﬁcation, in which a superordinate caste
withholds privileges from and refuses to intermarry
with a subordinate caste (or castes) which it
stigmatizes as ethnically alien’
HISTORY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 25
